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Abstract The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour 
of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that 
the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional 
conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a 
definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. 
Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no 
go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum 
system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton ‘uniqueness 
theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a 
determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular 
observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is 
appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are 
traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be 
viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence 
when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences. 
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1   Truth as Correspondence: The Traditional Framework 
In investigations concerning the problem of truth in the physical sciences, the 
correspondence theory of truth has frequently been thought of as the most eminent. 
Although the correspondence theory admits various different formulations, the core of 
any correspondence theory is the idea that a proposition is true if and only if it 
corresponds to or matches reality. The classical version of the theory describes this 
relationship as a correspondence to the facts about the world (e.g., Burgess et al. 2011, 
pp. 70-72). If so, then adopting a correspondence theory of truth amounts to endorsing 
instances of the following scheme: 
Correspondence to facts [CF]: The proposition that P is true if and only if P 
corresponds to a fact. 
Alternatively, if one construes the notion of a ‘fact’ in terms of the weaker notion of an 
obtaining ‘state of affairs’, as in an Austin-type theory, then, [CF] is re-expressed as 
follows:2 
                                                 
1 Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Sciences, University of Athens, University 
Campus, Athens 157 71, Greece; Email: karakost@phs.uoa.gr  
2 
 
Correspondence to states of affairs [CS]: The proposition that P is true if and only if 
there is a state of affairs X such that P corresponds to X and X obtains. 
The useful feature of states of affairs is that they refer to something that can be said to 
obtain or fail to obtain, to be the case or not to be the case, to be a fact or fail to be a fact, 
that is, they exist even when they are not concretely manifested or realized. 
       The logical factor involved in the traditional view of correspondence truth implies 
that wherever there is a true proposition there is a fact (or state of affairs) stated by it and 
wherever a fact (or state of affairs) a possible true proposition which states it. This seems 
uncontroversial, as being reflected into the biconditional connective ‘if and only if’ of the 
preceding alethic schemes, but taken in that way the theory is not illuminating. For, 
“corresponds to the facts” can function merely as a synonym, as an alternative extended 
way of saying “is true” (e.g., Lewis 2001). It is not clear, therefore, that anything 
substantial can be said about the correspondence relation, except that it is the relation in 
which a proposition stands to the world when the proposition is true; nor is it clear that 
the relevant facts, or states of affairs, can be specified except as those which make a 
particular proposition true. 
       If one wishes to generalize this and inquire into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a proposition to be true, it is difficult to go beyond the truism that if a 
proposition is true then the relevant fact is as the proposition says it is. Then, using a 
popular example in the philosophy literature, the proposition ‘snow is white’ is true 
because it corresponds to the fact that snow is white. Thus, the fact that makes a 
proposition true is a restatement of the proposition itself. Facts are merely re-expressions 
of the propositions they make true. 
       In this sense, in the traditional correspondence notion of truth, the truth-conditions, 
namely, the worldly conditions that make a proposition P true are simply given by P 
itself. It is natural to think, however, that if an account of truth in terms of correspondence 
with facts is not to be idle, one must deploy a notion of fact and of correspondence that 
would allow us to go further than the trivial equivalence between “it is true that P” and “it 
is a fact that P” (e.g., Engel 2002). A correspondence theory, fully worthy of the name, 
must go on to articulate an explanation of the correspondence relation that is more 
complex, and thus not amenable to the immediate restatement reply. In addition, there 
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must provide a genuine account of facts as special kinds of entities that can be candidates 
for the relationship of truth-making. 
       In particular, when examining the functioning of correspondence truth within 
physical science, it should be clear that it requires an understanding not just of the logical 
form of correspondence per se, but of the specific field of knowledge in which the 
correspondence relation is realized. Within this domain of inquiry, the primary question 
asked should be about what objects there are in the world, and what properties and 
relations are instantiated by these objects. Then, truth in terms of correspondence may be 
appropriately understood as property instantiation, in the following sense: if P is a true 
proposition, then P attributes some property to some object of the relevant domain. In this 
respect, the criticism exerted to the usual conception of correspondence truth does not 
imply the impossibility of a genuine correspondence account of truth, but, rather, by 
taking into account the specificities of the physics discourse, it attempts to determine the 
applicability and, if need be, to adjust appropriately the content of a correspondence 
account of truth when applied to the propositional language of fundamental physics (see, 
especially, Section 4). 
       It is worthy to note in this connection that the traditional theory of truth as 
correspondence, regardless of its exact formulation, has frequently been associated with 
the view that truth is radically non-epistemic (e.g., Devitt 2001, p. 606). This means that:  
Radically non-epistemic conception of truth: The truth (or falsity) of a proposition is 
entirely independent of anyone’s cognitive capacities, beliefs, theories, conceptual 
schemes, and so on. 
According to this non-epistemic conception, the truthmakers of propositions (namely, 
facts or actual states of affairs) are totally independent of human conceptualization and 
thus are among the intrinsic furniture of a mind-independent reality. Consequently, in 
order to say whether a given proposition is true or false one will need to have access to 
the way things are independently of our ability to verify or confirm or justify or even test 
this proposition. That is, to determine the truth of a proposition it seems that we must 
either compare it to raw, un-conceptualized reality or somehow have a privileged, direct 
and unproblematic access to reality.3 Henceforth, on this conception, facts or actual states 
of affairs, forming the object-end of the truthmaking relation, are considered as being 
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already given, as being completely autonomous in themselves, or as residing in the world 
purely extensionally, that is, in a manner independent of our worldviews and particular 
discursive practices and contexts. 
       In this sense, the view of a radically non-epistemic conception of truth incorporates 
the following transcendence condition: 
Transcendence condition: The truth of a proposition transcends our possible 
knowledge of it, or its evidential basis; it is empirically unconstrained. 
As a consequence of the preceding condition, even if it is impossible to produce a 
framework on which we may ascertain the truth value of a proposition this does not imply 
that the proposition does not possess any such value. It always has one. It is either 
determinately true or determinately false independently of any empirical evidence or 
cognitive means by which we may establish which value it is. The possession of truth 
values is therefore entirely independent of our means of warranting their assignment. 
       The transcendence condition, no doubt, attempts to capture the realist intuition that a 
proposition cannot be claimed true or false in virtue of its knowability or justifiability. 
For, a proposition may be true without being justified, and vice versa. Agreed! But what 
does the transcendence thesis, in its totality, really presuppose, especially when viewed 
within the traditional framework of correspondence truth? It presupposes the existence of 
a ‘platonic’ universe of true propositions, entirely independent of our ability in having 
access to it, and, henceforth, elements of this ideal world, in this case, propositions, 
possess determinate truth values entirely independent of our capability in forming 
justified convictions about them. In other words, it is important to realize that this thesis 
does not simply aim to establish an objective basis or attribute a non-epistemic character 
to the notion of truth ― that, for instance, the content of declarative propositions is 
rendered true (or false) on the basis of worldly conditions and not on some relevant 
beliefs of ours ― but this particular conception tends to be so radically non-epistemic that 
at the end leads to a notion of truth with absolutely no epistemic features. Be that as it 
may, I shall argue immediately below that the propositional structure of classical 
mechanics allows truth-value assignments in conformity with the usual traditional 
conception of a correspondence account of truth. 
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2   Propositional Truth in Classical Mechanics 
In classical mechanics a system S with n degrees of freedom is described by a phase space 
ΩS with 2n coordinates {qi, pi} which correspond to generalized position and momentum 
coordinates. The state of S at any temporal moment t is represented by a point Xt = {qi(t), 
pi(t)} of ΩS. Physical quantities are represented by real-valued functions on the phase 
space, e.g., the position q of a mass point is a function q: ΩS  R3. Physical properties ― 
namely, values of various physical quantities of the system ― are represented by Borel 
subspaces ΩSA, ΩSB, … of ΩS and will be denoted by P(A), P(B), …, respectively. Hence, 
a property is represented by a characteristic function P(A): ΩS {0, 1} with P(A) (X) = 1 
if X  ΩSA and P(A) (X) = 0 if X  ΩSA. We say that the characteristic function takes the 
value 1 or the property P(A) pertains to system S at time t if the state of S is represented 
by a point lying in the corresponding subset (Xt  ΩSA), and that P(A) does not pertain to 
S if the state of the system is represented by a point outside this subset (Xt  ΩSA). In 
terms of propositions PA, PB, … this means that a proposition PA is true if the property 
P(A) pertains to S, and false otherwise. That is, the proposition PA asserting that ‘system S 
acquires the property P(A)’, or equivalently, that ‘the value a of some physical quantity A 
of S lies in a certain range of values Δ’ (‘a  Δ’), is true if and only if the associated 
property P(A) obtains. In the propositional structure of classical mechanics, each point in 
phase space, representing a classical state of a given system S, defines a truth-value 
assignment to the subsets representing the propositions. Each subset to which the point 
belongs represents a true proposition or a property that is instantiated by the system. 
Likewise, each subset to which the point does not belong represents a false proposition or 
a property that is not instantiated by the system. Thus, every possible property of S is 
selected as either occurring or not; equivalently, every corresponding proposition 
pertaining to S is either true or false. 
       Hence, for present purposes, the really essential thing about the mode of 
representation of classical systems is that the algebra of properties or propositions of a 
classical mechanical system is isomorphic to the lattice of subsets of phase space, a 
Boolean lattice LB that can be interpreted semantically by a 2-valued truth-function. This 
means that to every proposition P  LB one of the two possible truth values 1 (true) and 0 
(false) can be assigned through the associated characteristic function; equivalently, any 
proposition is either true or false (tertium non datur) (e.g., Dalla Chiara et al. 2004, p. 
21). Thus, the propositions of a classical system are semantically decidable, 
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independently of any perceptual evidence or cognitive means by which we may verify or 
falsify them. 
       From a physical point of view this is immediately linked to the fact that classical 
physics views objects-systems as bearers of determinate properties. Specifically, classical 
physical systems are taken to obey a so-called ‘possessed values’ or ‘definite values’ 
principle that may be succinctly formulated as follows:4 
Definite values principle: Any classical system is characterized, at each instant of 
time, by definite values for all physical quantities pertaining to the system in 
question. 
That is, classical properties (values of physical quantities) are considered as being 
intrinsic to the system, as being possessed by the system itself. They are independent of 
whether or not any measurement is attempted on them and their definite values are 
independent of one another as far as measurement is concerned. Successive 
measurements of physical quantities, like position and momentum that define the state of 
a classical system, can be performed to any degree of accuracy and the results combined 
can completely determine the state of the system before and after the measurement 
interaction, since its effect, if not eliminable, takes place continuously in the system’s 
phase space and is therefore predictable in principle. Hence, during the act of 
measurement a classical system conserves its identity; measurement does not induce any 
qualitative changes on the state of the measured system. Thus, the principle of value-
definiteness implicitly incorporates the following assumption of non-contextuality: 
Non-contextuality: If a classical system possesses a property (value of a physical 
quantity), then it does so independently of any measurement context, i.e., 
independently of how that value is eventually measured. 
This means that the properties possessed by a classical system depend in no way on the 
relations obtaining between it and a possible experimental or measurement context used 
to bring these properties about. If a classical system possesses a given property, it does so 
independently of possessing other values pertaining to other experimental arrangements. 
All properties pertaining to a classical system are simultaneously determinate and 
potentially available to the system, regardless of our means of exploring and warranting 
their assignment. Accordingly, the propositions of a classical system are considered as 
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possessing determinate truth values ― they are either determinately true or determinately 
false ― prior to and independent of any actual investigation of the states of affairs the 
propositions denote; that is, classical mechanical propositions possess investigation-
independent truth values, thus capturing the radically non-epistemic character of a 
traditional correspondence account of truth. Truth-value definiteness is conceived in 
virtue of a stable and well-defined external reality which serves as the implicit referent of 
every proposition, so that it bears no further consequences in avoiding specifying the 
exact domain of reference. Consequently, in a classical universe of discourse, there is 
supposed to exist implicitly an Archimedean standpoint from which the totality of facts 
may be logically evaluated. 
 
 
3   Propositional Truth in Quantum Mechanics 
On the standard (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation of quantum theory, the elementary 
propositions pertaining to a quantum mechanical system form a non-Boolean lattice, LH, 
isomorphic to the lattice of closed linear subspaces or corresponding projection operators 
of a Hilbert space. Thus, a proposition pertaining to a quantum system is represented by a 
projection operator P on the system’s Hilbert space H or, equivalently, it is represented by 
the linear subspace HP of H upon which the projection operator P projects (e.g., Rédei 
1998, Sect. 4.2). Since each projection operator P on H acquires two eigenvalues 1 and 0, 
where the value 1 can be read as ‘true’ and 0 as ‘false’, the proposition ‘a system S in 
state |ψ has the property P(A)’ is said to be true if and only if the corresponding 
projection operator PA obtains the value 1, that is, if and only if PA |ψ = |ψ. Accordingly, 
the state |ψ of the system lies in the associated subspace HA which is the range of the 
operator PA, i.e., |ψ  ΗΑ. In such a circumstance, the property P(A) pertains to the 
quantum system S. Otherwise, if PA |ψ = 0 and, hence, |ψ  HA (subspace completely 
orthogonal to HA), the counter property P(A) pertains to S, and the proposition is said to 
be false. It might appear, therefore, that propositions of this kind have a well-defined truth 
value in a sense analogous to the truth-value assignment in classical mechanics. 
       There is, however, a significant difference between the two situations. Unlike the 
case in classical mechanics, for a given quantum system, the propositions represented by 
projection operators or Hilbert space subspaces are not partitioned into two mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets representing either true or false propositions. 
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As already pointed out, only propositions represented by subspaces that contain the 
system’s state are assigned the value ‘true’ (propositions assigned probability 1 by |ψ), 
and only propositions represented by spaces orthogonal to the state are assigned the value 
‘false’ (propositions assigned probability 0 by |ψ) (Dirac 1958, pp. 46-47; von Neumann 
1955, pp. 213-217). Hence, propositions represented by subspaces that are at some non-
zero or non-orthogonal angle to the unit vector |ψ or, more appropriately, to the ray 
representing the quantum state are not assigned any truth value in |ψ. These propositions 
are neither true nor false; they are assigned by |ψ a probability value different from 1 and 
0; thus, they are undecidable or indeterminate for the system in state |ψ and the 
corresponding properties are taken as indefinite. Suppose, for instance, we are referring to 
the spin property of a simple system, say an electron, whose spin in a certain direction 
may assume only two possible values: either + 
2
1 (‘up’) or - 
2
1 (‘down’). Now, the spin 
in the z-direction, Sz, and the spin in the y-direction, Sy, represent two incompatible 
observables that cannot be measured simultaneously. Suppose an electron in state |ψ 
satisfies the proposition ‘Sz is up’, so that |ψ is an eigenvector of Sz. Consequently, both 
propositions ‘Sy is up’ and ‘Sy is down’, represented by subspaces at some angle other 
than 0 or /2 to the state |ψ, shall be indeterminate. In such a circumstance, it cannot be 
asserted meaningfully that Sy possesses a specific value; any of the possible values of Sy 
can neither be regarded as manifested by the system in state |ψ, nor as excluded for the 
system. In particular, the proposition ‘Sy is up’ (or ‘Sy is down’) cannot be assigned a 
meaningful truth value. 
       This kind of semantic ambiguity far from signifying a perplexing feature peculiar to 
the spin property of one-half particles constitutes an inevitable consequence of the 
Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics demonstrated rigorously, for the first time, 
by Kochen-Specker's (1967) theorem. According to this, for any quantum system 
associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, there does not exist a 2-
valued, truth-functional assignment h: LH  {0, 1} on the set of closed linear subspaces, 
LH, interpretable as quantum mechanical propositions, preserving the lattice operations 
and the orthocomplement. In other words, the gist of the theorem, when interpreted 
semantically, asserts the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions 
pertaining to a physical system at any one time, for any of its quantum states, without 
generating a contradiction. What are, therefore, the maximal sets of subspaces of LH or 
the maximal subsets of propositions that can be taken as simultaneously determinate, that 
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is, as being assigned determinate (but perhaps unknown) truth values in an overall 
consistent manner? 
 
3.1   Maximal Sets of Simultaneously Determinate Quantum Mechanical Propositions 
In this respect, we employ the Bub-Clifton so-called ‘uniqueness theorem’ (Bub 2009; 
Bub & Clifton 1996). Consider, to this end, a quantum system S represented by an n-
dimensional Hilbert space whose state is represented by a ray or one-dimensional 
projection operator D = |  | spanned by the unit vector |  on H. Let A be an 
observable of S with m  n distinct eigenspaces Ai, while the rays DA i = (D  Ai
)  Ai, i = 
1, …, k  m, denote the non-zero projections of the state D onto these eigenspaces. Then, 
according to the Bub-Clifton theorem, the unique maximal sublattice of the lattice of 
projection operators or subspaces, LH, representing the propositions that can be 
determinately true or false of the system S, is given by 
LH ({DA i }) = { P  LH: DA i   P  or  DA i   P
, i, i = 1, …, k}. 
The sublattice LH ({DA i })  LH is generated by (i) the rays DA i , the non-zero projections 
of D onto the k eigenspaces of A, and (ii) all the rays in the subspace (DA 1   DA 2   …  
DA k )
  =  ( DA i )
 orthogonal to the subspace spanned by the DA i , for i = 1, …, k. Since 
the DA i  
are orthogonal, they are compatible and generate a Boolean sublattice of LH. So 
( DA k )
  = (DA 1 )
  (DA 2 )
  … (DA k )
. 
Effectively, the system’s Hilbert space is partitioned into k-orthogonal subspaces 
corresponding to a partition of the spectrum of A into k distinct eigenspaces. Hence, 
LH ({DA k }) = LH (DA 1 )  LH (DA 2 )  … LH (DA k ), 
since each LH (DA i ), i = 1, …, k, is generated by the ray DA i  and all the rays in the 
subspaces (DA i )
 orthogonal to DA i . The set of maximal (non-degenerate) observables 
associated with LH ({DA k }) includes any maximal observable with k eigenvectors in the 
directions DA i , i = 1, …, k. The set of non-maximal observables includes any non-
maximal observable that is a function of one of these maximal observables. Thus, all the 
observables whose eigenspaces are spanned by rays in LH({DA k }) are determinate, given 
the system’s state D and A. 
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       Identifying such maximal determinate sets of observables amounts, in effect, to a 
consistent assignment of truth values to the associated propositions in LH ({DA k }) of LH, 
not to all propositions in LH. LH({DA k }) represents the maximal subsets of propositions 
pertaining to a quantum system that can be taken as having simultaneously determinate 
truth values, where a truth-value assignment is defined by a 2-valued (or Boolean) 
homomorphism, h: LH ({DA k })  {0,1}. If the system’s Hilbert space H is more than 2-
dimensional, there are exactly k 2-valued homomorphisms on LH ({DA k }), where the i
th 
homomorphism assigns to proposition DA i  the value 1 (i.e., true) and the remaining 
propositions in LH ({DA i }), i = 1, …, k, the value 0 (i.e., false). The determinate sublattice 
LH ({DA k }) is maximal, in the sense that, if we add anything to it, lattice closure 
generates the lattice LH of all subspaces of H, and there are no 2-valued homomorphisms 
on LH (Bub 2009). 
       In fact, the Bub-Clifton determinate sublattice LH ({DA i }) constitutes a generalization 
of the usual Dirac-von Neumann codification of quantum mechanics. On this standard 
position, an observable has a determinate value if and only if the state D of the system is 
an eigenstate of the observable. Equivalently, the propositions that are determinately true 
or false of a system are the propositions represented by subspaces that either include the 
ray denoting the state D of the system, or are orthogonal to D. Thus, the Dirac-von 
Neumann determinate sublattice can be formulated as 
LH(D)  =  { P  LH: D  P  or  D  P }. 
It is simply generated by the state D and all the rays in the subspace orthogonal to D. If 
the system’s Hilbert space H is more than 2-dimensional, there is one and only 2-valued 
homomorphism on LH(D): the homomorphism induced by mapping the state D onto 1 and 
every other ray orthogonal to D onto 0. Apparently, the sublattice LH(D) for a particular 
choice of an observable A in state D forms a subset of Bub-Clifton’s proposal LH ({DA i }). 
The latter will only agree with LH(D) if D is an eigenstate of A, for then the set {DA i } 
consists of only D itself. In general, the sublattice LH ({DA i }) contains all the propositions 
in LH(D) that it makes sense to talk about consistently with A-propositions, namely 
propositions that are strictly correlated to the spectral projections of some suitable 
preferred observable A. From this perspective, the Dirac-von Neumann sublattice is 
obtained by taking A as the unit (or identity) observable I. As Bub & Clifton (1996) 
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rightly observe, however, there is nothing in the mathematical structure of Hilbert space 
quantum mechanics that necessitates the selection of the preferred determinate observable 
A as the unit observable I, whilst, in addition, this choice leads to von Neumann’s account 
of quantum measurement resulting in a sequential regress of observing observers. 
       Then, the following question arises. What specifies the choice of a particular 
preferred observable A as determinate if AI? The Bub-Clifton proposal allows, in effect, 
different choices for A corresponding to various different ‘no collapse’ interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, as for instance Bohm’s (1952) hidden variable theory, if the 
privileged observable A is fixed as position in configuration space, or modal 
interpretations that exploit the bi-orthogonal decomposition theorem (e.g., Dieks et al. 
1998). In them the preferred determinate observable is not always fixed but varies with 
the quantum state. 
 
 
4   Contextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics 
4.1   Context-Dependent Assignment of Truth Values 
In our view, if one wishes to stay within the framework of Hilbert space quantum 
mechanics and refrains from introducing additional structural elements, the most natural 
and immediate choice of a suitable preferred observable, especially, for confronting the 
problem of truth-value assignments, results in the determinateness of the observable to be 
measured. This is physically motivated by the fact that in the quantum domain one cannot 
assign, in a consistent manner, definite sharp values to all quantum mechanical 
observables pertaining to a microphysical object, in particular to pairs of incompatible 
observables, independently of the measurement context actually specified. In terms of the 
structural component of quantum theory, this is due to functional relationship constraints 
that govern the algebra of quantum mechanical observables, as revealed by the Kochen-
Specker theorem alluded to above and its recent investigations (e.g., Cabello 2006; 
Kirchmair et al. 2009; Yu et al. 2012). In view of them, it is not possible, not even in 
principle, to assign to a quantum system definite non-contextual properties corresponding 
to all possible measurements. This means that it is not possible to assign a definite unique 
truth value to every single yes-no proposition, represented by a projection operator, 
independent of which subset of mutually commuting projection operators one may 
consider it to be a member. Hence, by means of a generalized example, if A, B and E 
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denote observables of the same quantum system, so that the corresponding projection 
operator A commutes with operators B and E ([A, B] = 0 = [A, E]), not however the 
operators B and E with each other ([B, E]  0), then the result of a measurement of A 
depends on whether the system had previously been subjected to a measurement of the 
observable B or a measurement of the observable E or in none of them. Thus, the value of 
the observable A depends upon the set of mutually commuting observables one may 
consider it with, that is, the value of A depends upon the selected set of measurements. In 
other words, the value of the observable A cannot be thought of as pre-fixed, as being 
independent of the experimental context actually chosen, as specified, in our example, by 
the {A, B} or {A, E} frame of mutually compatible observables. Accordingly, the truth 
value assigned to the associated proposition ‘a  Δ’ ― i.e., ‘the value a of the observable 
A of system S lies in a certain range of values Δ’ ― should be contextual as it depends on 
whether A is thought of in the context of simultaneously ascribing a truth value to 
propositions about B, or to propositions about E. In fact, any attempt of simultaneously 
ascribing context-independent, sharp values to all observables of a quantum object forces 
the quantum statistical distribution of value assignment into the pattern of a classical 
distribution, thus leading directly to contradictions of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger 
type (for a recent discussion see Greenberger 2009).  
       This state of affairs reflects most clearly the unreliability of the so-called ‘definite 
values’ principle of classical physics of Section 2, according to which, values of physical 
quantities are regarded as being possessed by an object independently of any 
measurement context. The classical underpinning of such an assumption is conclusively 
shown to be incompatible with the structure of the algebra of quantum mechanical 
observables. Whereas in classical physics, nothing prevented one from considering as if 
the phenomena reflected intrinsic properties, in quantum physics, even the as if is 
restricted. Indeed, quantum phenomena are not stable enough across series of 
measurements of non-commuting observables in order to be treated as direct reflections 
of invariable properties; the microphysical world seems to be sensitive to our 
experimental intervention. 
       Now, the selection of a particular observable to be measured necessitates also the 
selection of an appropriate experimental or measurement context with respect to which 
the measuring conditions remain intact. Formally, a measurement context CA(D) can be 
defined by a pair (D, A), where, as previously, D = |ψψ| is an idempotent projection 
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operator denoting the general initial state of system S and A = i aiPi is a self-adjoint 
operator denoting the measured observable. Of course, CA(D) is naturally extended to all 
commuting, compatible observables which, at least in principle, are co-measurable 
alongside of A. Then, in accordance with the Bub-Clifton theorem, given the state D of S, 
D restricted to the set of all propositions concerning A is necessarily expressed as a 
weighted mixture DA = 
k
i 1
|ci|
2|aiai| of determinate truth-value assignments, where each 
|ai is an eigenvector of A and |ci| = |ψ, ai|, i = 1,..., k. Since DA is defined with respect to 
the selected context CA(D), DA may be called a representative contextual state.
5 In other 
words, DA is a mixed state over a set of basis states that are eigenstates of the measured 
observable A, and it reproduces the probability distribution that D assigns to the values of 
A. Thus, with respect to the representative contextual state DA the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
i)  Each |ai is an eigenvector of A. Thus, each quantum mechanical proposition DA i  P|a i  
= |aiai|, i = 1,..., k, assigns in relation to CA(D) some well-defined value to A (i.e., the 
eigenvalue αi satisfying A|ai = αi|ai). 
ii) Any eigenvectors |ai, |aj, ij, of A are orthogonal. Thus, the various possible 
propositions {P|a i }, i = 1,..., k, are mutually exclusive within CA(D). In this sense, the 
different orthogonal eigenstates {|ai}, i = 1,..., k, correspond to different values of the 
measured observable A or to different settings of the apparatus situated in the context 
CA(D). 
iii) Each |ai is non-orthogonal to D = |ψψ|. Thus, each proposition P|a i  whose truth 
value is not predicted with certainty is possible with respect to CA(D). 
                                                 
5 In justifying from a physical point of view the aforementioned term, it is worthy to note that the state DA, 
which results as a listing of well-defined properties or equivalently determinate truth-value assignments 
selected by a 2-valued homomorphism on LH ({DA i }), may naturally be viewed as constituting a state 
preparation of system S in the context of the preferred observable A to be measured. Thus, the state DA 
should not be regarded as the final post-measurement state, reached after an A-measurement has been 
carried out on the system concerned. On the contrary, the contextual state represents here an alternative 
description of the initial state D of S by taking specifically into account the selection of a particular 
observable, and hence of a suitable experimental context, on which the state of the system under 
measurement can be conditioned. In other words, it provides a redescription of the measured system which 
is necessitated by taking specifically into account the context of the selected observable. For, it is important 
to realize that this kind of redescription is intimately related to the fact that both states D and DA represent 
the same object system S, albeit in different ways. Whereas D refers to a general initial state of S 
independently of the specification of any particular observable, and hence, regardless of the determination 
of any measurement context, the state DA constitutes a conditionalization state preparation of S with respect 
to the observable to be measured, while dropping all ‘unrelated’ reference to observables that are 
incompatible with such a preparation procedure. 
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       It is evident, therefore, that the contextual state DA represents the set of all 
probabilities of events corresponding to quantum mechanical propositions P|a i  that are 
associated with the measurement context CA(D). In it the propositions P|a i  correspond in 
a one-to-one manner with disjoint subsets of the spectrum of the observable A and hence 
generate a Boolean lattice of propositions.6 Thus, the P|a i propositions are assigned 
determinate truth values, in the standard Kolmogorov sense, by the state DA. 
       It is instructive to note at this point that creating a preparatory Boolean environment 
CA(D) for a system S in state D to interact with a measuring arrangement does not 
determine which event will take place, but it does determine the kind of event that will 
take place. It forces the outcome, whatever it is, to belong to a certain definite Boolean 
sublattice of events for which the standard measurement conditions are invariant. Such a 
set of standard conditions for a definite kind of measurement constitutes a set of 
necessary and sufficient constraints for the occurrence of an event of the selected kind. 
This equivalently means, in relation to quantum theory, that the selection of an observable 
to be measured, by means of a corresponding preparation procedure, instantiates locally a 
physical context, which serves as a logical Boolean reference frame7 for the individuation 
of events. It is probably one of the deepest insights of modern quantum theory that 
whereas the totality of all experimental/empirical events can only be represented in a 
globally non-Boolean structure, the acquisition of every single event depends on a locally 
Boolean context. 
 
 
4.2   Contextual Account of Truth 
In view of the preceding considerations, therefore, and in relation to philosophical 
matters, we propose a contextual account of truth that is compatible with the propositional 
structure of quantum theory by conforming to the following instance of the 
correspondence scheme: 
                                                 
6 In fact, the determinate observable A picks up a Boolean sublattice in LH({DA i }) which, in view of the 
Bub-Clifton theorem, is straightforwardly extended to LH({DA i }) itself. The latter comprises as determinate 
all observables whose eigenspaces are spanned by the rays DA i , given the system’s state D and A. These 
technicalities, however, bear no further significance for present purposes.    
7 Such a conceptual viewpoint has been also suggested in Davis (1977) and Takeuti (1978) and, recently, 
within a category-theoretic perspective of quantum theory, by Zafiris and Karakostas (2013). 
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Contextual correspondence [CC]: The proposition that P-in-C is true if and only if 
there is a state of affairs X such that (1) P expresses X in C and (2) X obtains, 
where C denotes, in general, the context of discourse, and specifically, in relation to the 
aforementioned quantum mechanical considerations, the experimental context CA(D) 
linked to the proposition P  LH ({DA i }) under investigation. 
       If, however, truth-value assignments to quantum mechanical propositions are 
context-dependent in some way as the scheme [CC] implies, it would appear, according 
to traditional thinking, that one is committed to antirealism about truth. In our opinion, 
this assumption is mistaken. The contextual account of truth suggested here is compatible 
with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a 
‘God’s-eye view’ or an absolute Archimedean standpoint from which to state the totality 
of facts of nature. For, in relation to the microphysical world, there isn’t a context-
independent way of interacting with it. Any microphysical fact or event that ‘happens’ is 
raised at the empirical level only in conjunction with the specification of an experimental 
context that conforms to a set of observables co-measurable by that context (e.g., Svozil 
2009).8 In this respect, empirical access to the non-Boolean quantum world can only be 
gained by adopting a particular perspective, which is defined by a determinate sublattice 
LH({DA i }), or, in a more concrete sense, by the specification of an experimental context 
CA(D) that, in effect, selects a particular observable A as determinate. Within the context 
CA(D), the A-properties we attribute to the object under investigation have determinate 
values, but the values of incompatible observables, associated with incompatible 
(mutually exclusive) experimental arrangements, are indeterminate. Hence, at any 
temporal moment, there is no universal context that allows either an independent 
variation of the properties of a quantum object or a unique description of the object in 
terms of determinate properties. And this yields furthermore an explicit algebraic 
interpretation of the Bohrian notion of complementarity (a non-Copenhagean, of course), 
in so far as quantum mechanical properties obtain effectively determinate values ― 
alternately, the associated propositions acquire determinate truth-value assignments ― 
                                                 
8 It should be pointed out that Bohr already on the basis of his complementarity principle introduced the 
concept of a ‘quantum phenomenon’ to refer “exclusively to observations obtained under specified 
circumstances, including an account of the whole experiment” (Bohr 1963, p. 73). This feature of context-
dependence is also present in Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory by clearly putting 
forward that “quantum properties cannot be said to belong to the observed system alone and, more 
generally, that such properties have no meaning apart from the total context which is relevant in any 
particular situation. In this sense, this includes the overall experimental arrangement so that we can say that 
measurement is context dependent” (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p. 108). 
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within a particular quasi-Boolean sub-structure LH({DA i }), whereas the underlying source 
of quantum mechanical ‘strangeness’ is located in the fact that they cannot be 
simultaneously realized or embedded within a single Boolean logical structure. 
       Furthermore, the proposed account of truth, as encapsulated by the scheme [CC] of 
contextual correspondence, ought to be disassociated from an epistemic notion of truth. 
The reference to an experimental context in quantum mechanical considerations should 
not be viewed primarily as offering the evidential or verificationist basis for the truth of a 
proposition; it does not aim to equate truth to verification. Nor should it be associated 
with practices of instrumentalism, operationalism and the like; it does not aim to reduce 
theoretical terms to products of operational procedures. It rather provides the appropriate 
conditions under which it is possible for a proposition to receive consistently a truth 
value. Whereas in classical mechanics the conditions under which elementary 
propositions are claimed to be true or false are determinate independently of the context 
in which they are expressed, in contradistinction, the truth-conditions of quantum 
mechanical propositions are determinate within a context. On account of the Kochen-
Specker theorem, there simply does not exist, within a quantum mechanical discourse, a 
consistent binary assignment of determinately true or determinately false propositions 
independent of the appeal to a context; propositional content seems to be linked to a 
context. This connection between referential context and propositional content means that 
a descriptive elementary proposition in the domain of quantum mechanics is, in a sense, 
incomplete unless it is accompanied by the specified conditions of an experimental 
context under which the proposition becomes effectively truth-valued (see, in addition, 
Karakostas 2012). In other words, the specification of the context is part and parcel of 
the truth-conditions that should obtain for a proposition in order the latter to be invested 
with a determinate (albeit unknown) truth value. Otherwise, the proposition is, in general, 
semantically undecidable. In the quantum description, therefore, the introduction of the 
experimental context is to select at any time t a specific sublattice LH({DA i }) in the total 
non-Boolean lattice LH of propositions of a quantum system as co-definite; that is, each 
proposition in LH({DA i }) is assigned at time t a definite truth value, ‘true’ or ‘false’, or 
equivalently, each corresponding property of the system either obtains or does not obtain. 
In effect, the specification of the context provides the necessary conditions whereby 
bivalent assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions is in principle 
applicable. The obtainment of the conditions implies that it is possible for us to make, in 
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an overall consistent manner, meaningful statements that the properties attributed to 
quantum objects are part of physical reality. This marks the fundamental difference 
between conditions for well-defined attribution of truth values to propositions and mere 
verification conditions. 
       This element also signifies the transition from the transcendence condition of the 
conventional correspondence theory of truth of Section 1 to a reflective-like 
transcendental reasoning of the proposed account of truth. That is, it signifies the 
transition from the uncritical qualification of truth values to propositions beyond the 
limits of experience and acknowledging them as being true or false simpliciter, to the 
demarcation of the limits of possible experience or to the establishment of pre-conditions 
which make possible the attribution of truth values to propositions. In the quantum 
description, therefore, the specification of the experimental context forms a pre-condition 
of quantum physical experience, which is necessary if quantum mechanics is to grasp 
empirical reality at all. In this respect, the specification of the context constitutes a 
methodological act preceding any empirical truth in the quantum domain and making it 
possible. 
       In closing this work, I wish to re-emphasize the fact that the proposed account of 
truth of contextual correspondence [CC] while preserves the realist intuition of the notion 
of correspondence truth, nonetheless, characterizes the makers of propositional truths as 
being context-dependent, if the world, in its microphysical dimension, is to be correctly 
describable. Truthmakers of quantum mechanical propositions, namely facts or actual 
states of affairs, are not pre-determined, pre-fixed; they are not ‘out there’ wholly 
unrestrictedly. And if facts are context-dependent, then whatever truths may be expressed 
about them must also be contextual. Truth contextuality follows naturally from the 
contextuality of facts. The truthmaking relationship is now established, not in terms of a 
raw un-conceptualized reality, as envisaged by the traditional scheme, but between a 
well-defined portion of reality as carved out by the experimental context and the 
propositional content that refers to the selected context. Such interdependence of 
propositional content and referential context is not by virtue of some meta-scientific 
principle or philosophical predilection, but by virtue of the microphysical nature of 
physical reality displaying a context-dependence of facts. For, as already argued, a 
quantum mechanical proposition is not true or false simpliciter, but acquires a 
determinate truth value with respect to a well-defined context of discourse as specified by 
the state of the quantum system concerned and the particular magnitude to be measured. 
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Thus, the conditions under which a proposition is true are jointly determined by the 
context in which the proposition is expressed and the actual microphysical state of affairs 
as projected into the specified context. In our approach, therefore, the reason that a 
proposition is true is because it designates an objectively existing state of affairs, albeit of 
a contextual nature.  On the other hand, the traditional conception of correspondence 
truth, as exemplified either by the alethic scheme [CF] or [CS], alluded to in the 
introduction, and involving a direct context-independent relation between singular terms 
of propositions and definite autonomous facts of an external reality, may be viewed as a 
species or as a limit case of the more generic alethic scheme of contextual correspondence 
[CC], when the latter is applied in straightforward unproblematic circumstances where the 
non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences. 
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